On Arab-Iranian Relations

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ON ARAB - IRANIAN RELATIONS

This pamphlet consists of three = articles written=20 by Mr. Tareq Aziz, member of the Revolutionary Command Council and = deputy Prime=20 Minister in Iraq, on Arab-Iranian relations and published by al-Thawra = daily=20 newspaper of Baghdad and also by al-Watan al-Araby weekly magazine of = Paris, in=20 May 1980.

These articles present an analytical = account of=20 the historical roots of Arab-Iranian relations and the development of = these=20 relations in recent years under the old rulers as the new = ones.

Tareq=20 Aziz

ON ARAB - IRANIAN = RELATIONS

To avoid confusing the issues = keeping the=20 facts secret and letting the conspiracy pass unnoticed.

Published by:

Translation and Publishing=20 Department,

Ministry of Culture and=20 Information,

Baghdad.

Summer 1980

Ever since its modern-day revival = began, the=20 Arab nation has been the target of various types of plots and challenges = aimed=20 at its very essence, its cultural character, and sections of its land, = as well=20 as at its freedom, its basic interests and its rightful ambitions = towards unity=20 and progress. For years, the nation has been in a state of acute = tension, and=20 has experienced sharp conflicts with both itself and with external = forces, none=20 of which has yet been resolved. Even though suffering bitter setbacks = and grave=20 defeats, the Arab nation and its revolutionary liberation movement have=20 nevertheless achieved several victories over this long and difficult = period of=20 emergence to the fore.

About the past and present state of = the nation,=20 about the causes of its setbacks and victories, and about the lessons to = be=20 inferred, there is much which can be said. In this modest attempt, = however, I=20 would like to shed light on a particular aspect, which, in relation to = the=20 current circumstances of the Arab nation, I believe to be of exceptional = significance and to have played a fundamental role in both the setbacks = and=20 triumphs. This aspect concerns the clarity and confusion of issues and = their=20 link with the Arab nation of today, with specific reference to its = relations=20 with Iran.

A sound study of the Arab struggle = and the=20 course it has followed over the years of conflict and = tension=20 reveals an important fact. It is that the Arab nation and = its=20 revolutionary liberation movement, even when relatively=20 weak from the material point of view, are at their strongest = and=20 best in the battles =20 waged and challenges faced when circumstances = are=20 un-ambivalent and the enemies clearly pinpointed than when the issues = are=20 confused, when the image is shaky, and when the enemy has no clear = outline. The=20 same still applies even once, materially speaking, the Nation and its = Movement=20 grow stronger.

One might say this is a general = observation=20 which makes no particular distinction of the Arab nation and its = revolutionary=20 liberation movement. This is true, but the tragedy of the Arab nation is = that=20 too many of its people and leaders are insufficiently aware of the above = truth,=20 whereas their adversaries are giving it their avid attention, and making = shrewd=20 and malicious use of it on a wide scale. This phenomenon occurs time and = time=20 again, and when the Nation appears strong, ready to progress and to = witness a=20 revival, the losses and setbacks recur. Let us take some examples from=20 contemporary history familiar to today's generation and = compare.

In the 1940's, the greater part of = the Arab=20 Homeland was under direct colonial rule. Only a small number of Arab = countries=20 had independence, but owing to the widespread colonial influence in = political,=20 economic, administrative and cultural fields, even these were bound by = foreign=20 precepts and agreements. They were also poor, backward, and militarily = weak, and=20 their diplomatic channels and information systems extremely=20 unsophisticated.

By this time, the Zionist plan to = establish=20 the-Jewish state in Palestine was complete, and even though weak and = backward,=20 the Arab regimes were compelled to fight back and resist. The Zionists, = with the=20 support of the entire colonial world and a certain measure of Soviet = assistance,=20 were therefore only able to seize a limited portion of Palestinian = territory=20 where they then established their usurping entity. The response of the = Arab=20 nation was one of complete rejection, and the determination to repel the = Zionist=20 entity remained firm, as did hopes of retrieving the usurped=20 homeland.

More than thirty years later, all = the Arab=20 countries had gained their independence, by which time their armies, = information=20 systems and diplomatic channels were far superior than in the 1940's.=20 Furthermore, the budgets of a considerable number \)f these countries = were now=20 being calculated in terms of billions. However, in the wake of this = relative=20 strength in the Arab position we find many Arab circles have come to = accept the=20 Zionist usurpation of the land occupied before 1967, and even have = dealings of=20 one form or another with the Zionist entity. Not only this but the = president of=20 the largest Arab state has gone as far as to recognize and ally himself = with=20 this very entity and with imperialism against the Arab = nation.

Naturally, this outlook has = political, economic=20 and cultural reasons of local, Arab and international dimensions, about = which=20 there is much to be said. However, we must not forget that the man = responsible,=20 namely Sadaat, is the same man who broadcast the first communiqu=E9 of = the July=20 23rd Revolution of 1952. He was also a deputy to the nationalist = president,=20 Abdul Nasser, until the moment of his death, and was Egypt's ruler at = the 'time=20 of the October 1973 war. In the stage after this war, only a small = number of=20 revolutionary Arab national forces were aware of the twisted path being = followed=20 by Sadaat, whereas the majority considered him a national leader. Even = if some=20 disagreed with him on certain details and tactics, many Arab political = leading=20 circles remained his ally, even to the day before his inauspicious visit = to=20 Jerusalem.

How is it that Sadaat could have = moved from the=20 position of "national leader" and "hero of the October war", as he was = regarded=20 even by the circles which now oppose him, to one of recognizing the = Zionist=20 entity and betraying the Arab cause in such a shameless and unveiled = manner?=20 This too when the political leading circles of the 1940's and 1950's, = with all=20 that we know of them and their reactionary nature and foreign ties, = could not=20 even have contemplated doing a portion of what Sadaat has = done.

I hold that the basic "secret" is = that the=20 battle between the Arabs and the Zionist entity in the 1940's and = 195()'s was an=20 open one where the lines of both sides were clearly marked. Thus, even = those=20 rulers who overtly associated themselves with Western colonialism dared = not do=20 what Sadaat did a few decades later.

It would not be wrong to say that = if, a year=20 after taking over the presidency, Sadaat had declared his resolve to go = to=20 Jerusalem and cooperate directly with the Zionist enemy, the masses = would have=20 had him destroyed or killed, and violently so too. Equally, had he = declared his=20 intentions directly after the October war he would have faced strong = opposition,=20 but in 1977 he was able to do this and carry through his conspiratorial=20 plan?

What Sadaat cunningly and viciously = did was to=20 organize the process gradually in such a way as to shuffle the cards. He = confused military action, apparently resembling a war of liberation, = with the=20 political flexibility which results in various causes and other = interests being=20 gradually abandoned. Prior to this, Sadaat had confused the issues of = democracy=20 and the need to rectify certain aspects of the Nasser experiment with = the=20 counter-revolution and assault on this progressive experiment. He also = confused=20 independence in dealing with the Soviet Union with actual bias towards = the=20 United States.

Sadaat blurred the distinction = between several=20 issues, which, if taken separately, would appear to a short-sighted = observer,=20 lawful and necessary. This he did, however, in a way which perplexed the = masses=20 and made them feel at a loss, thus making it easy for the conspirator to = put his=20 plot into action after having systematically destroyed, paralyzed or = isolated=20 the forces capable of resistance one after the other. In this he = succeeded by=20 deviously confusing, deceiving and fragmenting all nationalist, = Egyptian, Arab=20 and international forces and elements opposed to his true purpose, = whilst=20 simultaneously acting to rally together, strengthen and organize the = Egyptian,=20 Arab and international forces supporting him. For this, he used = different=20 parties, individuals, movements, leaderships and countries, all of which = eventually discovered that they were being used for purposes other than = those of=20 which they had originally thought.

Let us now turn to another = historical example=20 which is still remembered by today's generation. In the 1950's, there = were two=20 fronts in the Arab arena. One was reactionary and linked to Western = colonialism.=20 It advocated ties with the Western military allies, and was led by the = Nuri Said=20 regime in Iraq. The other was nationalist and opposed to the colonial = rule and=20 influence. It advocated liberation and neutrality, and was led by Abdul = Nasser.=20 Between the two there was bitter strife in the fields of politics and=20 information. There was no question of the strength and tyranny of the = =95=20 reactionary colonial front.

However, since the battle was open, = and since=20 the enemy lines were clearly marked, the Arab liberation movement = progressed and=20 strengthened, foiling attempts to spread the Baghdad Pact throughout (he = countries of the area, and a great historic achievement was made with = the union=20 of Syria and Egypt and the establishment of the United Arab Republic = (UAR). In=20 July, 1958, a revolution took place in Iraq, and the regime of Nuri = Sa'id and=20 the Baghdad Pact was toppled. The-Arab nationalists then felt that they = had=20 attained a high point of strength in countering the colonialist forces = and their=20 clients within the area of the Arab Homeland. Also the horizons became, = open=20 before them on the road to liberation, progress and unity. But let us = just see=20 how matters took their course.

Amongst the forces of Arab = nationalism there=20 were various opinions about the prevailing conditions within the UAR in = terms of=20 the method of rule, the democratic options and the like. Nevertheless, = those=20 loyal to the cause of unity believed that the UAR, as a large Arab power = established in modern history, constituted at the very least a powerful = obstacle=20 to Zionist aggression.

When the revolution took place in = Iraq,=20 undoubtedly nationalist and hostile to colonialism, the forces of Arab=20 nationalism immediately called for the union between Iraq and the UAR.=20 Conversely, Abdul Karim Qassim, along with the Iraqi communists and all=20 regional, anti-Arab and reactionary elements and forces, propounded the = issue of=20 democracy.

Unquestionably, democracy is an = issue both=20 rightful and vital within the Arab struggle, but the parties to this = alliance=20 put democracy against nationalism and union with the UAR. They launched = a=20 large-scale war against the UAR, and against Abdul Nasser, Arab = nationalism, and=20 the national forces in Iraq, particularly the Baath party. They were = joined by=20 certain Arab parties and international forces. Because the cards had = been=20 shuffled and an intricate web woven, a complicated situation arose. The = Arab=20 patriot therefore felt puzzled and lost, his feelings wavering between = the=20 importance of unity and the need for democracy. He was also enveloped in = a whirl=20 of conflict in which no one side appeared to be any more right than=20 another.

The outcome was that the plan for = union between=20 Iraq and the UAR was thwarted, and the national forces in Iraq, with the = Arab=20 Socialist Baath Party at the fore, were dealt heavy blows. Consequently = the=20 question of democracy was buried, and a harsh military dictatorship = ruled in=20 Iraq on one hand, and on the other, the separatists, who had greatly = benefited=20 from the conflict of Qassim, the communists and their allies with the = UAR,=20 succeeded in their plot for secession.

Such was the state of the Arab = nation three=20 years after the revolution in Iraq after all the conditions for the Arab = revolutionary movement to grow and spread were ripe. The Syrian-Egyptian = union,=20 as well as democracy in Iraq, were lost, and the only beneficiaries were = the=20 Zionists and colonialists. This must not be forgotten when dealing with=20 current-day issues, for even if in superficial aspects they differ from = the=20 past, the basic facts still remain the same. The two examples cited will = perhaps=20 help us to follow the right path, and to differentiate between the = beneficial=20 and the harmful from amongst the mass of contradictory attitudes and = confused=20 questions.

What exactly are the dangers = currently=20 threatening the Arab nation? And, within the framework of these = conditions, how=20 should we interpret the behaviour of the Iranian leaders=92 vis-=E0-vis = the Arab=20 causes, and their actions against Iraq, and in particular against its=20 nationalist revolutionary leadership?

These issues are being confused on a = large=20 scale. They are also being discussed in a heated manner. However, = despite this=20 complicated picture, it is my belief that the forces of nationalism are = able to=20 distinguish right from wrong, and to find the true path, if they return = to the=20 original source material and recall their bitter experiences of the past = and the=20 lessons learnt.

The Arab Homeland has = numerous=20 problems and acute political and social contradictions. Class conflict = and=20 wide-scale corruptions still exist, particularly in certain regimes, and = there=20 are various cases of foreign influence and instances of backwardness in = many=20 fields etc. Nevertheless, within the framework of this situation, where = opinions=20 vary as to the best way of dealing with the different parties, = movements, and=20 intellectual and political trends, there is a sort of unanimity or = rather an=20 almost unanimous agreement that the greatest current dangers to the Arab = nation=20 are the existence of the Zionist entity and the presence of foreign = influence,=20 both presenting a continual and ever-increasing threat. There is then = the=20 vicious betrayal by Sadat's regime of the Arab cause, the results of = which=20 threaten the balance of conflict between the Arab nation on the one = hand, and=20 its Zionist enemy on the other. There is likewise near consensus on the = need to=20 counter these dangers with a unified Arab stand.

What then are the conditions and = stands which=20 weaken or strengthen this confrontation? When Sadaat signed the Camp = David=20 accords, a dangerous situation arose in the Arab arena, as well as wide = scale=20 confusion, and a strong fear that the Camp David plan might spread to = other=20 countries. Calls were made for foreign strategies to be embraced to = counter the=20 American-Zionist-Sadaat machination, and there was much despair and=20 despondency.

The result was an extremely negative = one, and=20 had it continued for long, the danger caused by Sadat's betrayal and the = establishment of the American-Zionist - Sadaat alliance would have = reached=20 alarming proportions.

Iraq with its national leadership = then assumed a=20 national and historic role, which was widely acknowledged, even by those = normally unfavorable towards Iraq. In other words, Iraq, even though it = had no=20 previous experience in dealing with Arab summits, took the initiative = for=20 holding the Baghdad Summit. After a complex political battle, it emerged = from=20 the conference having succeeded in adopting a national stand, considered = to be=20 "the minimum limit" but it allowed those who wished to go further to do = just=20 that, and the possibilities for further development were kept = open.

When the reconciliation agreements = between=20 Sadaat and the Zionist entity were signed on March 26th, 1979, Iraq, = which also=20 hosted the Conference of Arab Ministers for Foreign and Economic Affairs = succeeded, after a hard and complicated political fight, in setting the=20 conditions for taking resolutions of higher quality and broader outlook = than=20 those adopted by the summit a few months earlier.

Hence, a favourable Arab position = against=20 Sadat's betrayal was formed, which, through the development of its = positive=20 elements, could move forward, even if not fast enough to satisfy the = ambitions=20 of the revolutionary nationalists demanding a "maximum limit" programme. = This=20 position was nevertheless still relatively advanced in comparison to = what might=20 have transpired were it not for the Baghdad Summit and its subsequent=20 outcome.

The greatest achievement of the = Baghdad Summit=20 was its great success in sifting the issues confused by Sadaat and = unraveling=20 the mazes created when he sank to the lowest level of treachery. After = the=20 summit, it became clear to the Arab and Egyptian masses, to Islamic=20 public-opinion, and to public opinion in both the third world and=20 internationally, that there were two different and widely separate = stands: that=20 of Sadaat, and that of the majority of the Arab nation.

The clarity which resulted from the = Baghdad=20 Summit enabled the Arab nation, in a matter of months, dedicated to = political=20 and diplomatic activities, to isolate Sadaat amongst the Arabs, as well = as=20 within the Islamic world and the non-aligned movement. This weakened his = position in Africa and prevented Western Europe from standing firmly = behind him.=20 The latter instead adopted a stand much closer to that of the Baghdad=20 Summit.

All this reflected the increasingly = tortuous=20 path followed by the Camp David accords, as well as the position of = Sadat's=20 regime within Egypt. His misconduct influence on the Egyptian masses = decreased,=20 and his economic, political and security crises increased. In relation = to the=20 Arab-Zionist conflict, these results are extremely significant. Whilst = it is=20 true to say that they failed to deal a magic blow to the conflict =97 = impossible=20 in such conflicts in any case =97 they nonetheless rectified the whole = situation,=20 even if the gains made in the Arab interest were only small.

It was in such circumstances that = the Shah of=20 Iran fell, and the new leaders came to rule in Iran. I shall not = evaluate the=20 events in Iran here, nor shall 1 discuss whether it was a revolution or = merely a=20 popular uprising. We shan't dispute the nature of the revolution and its = consequences, but will just deal with the position of the Iranian = leadership and=20 its link with that of the Arab nation in its struggle against Zionism, = and=20 against Sadat's treachery and the imperialist scheming.

If we look back we'll soon find that = the Iranian=20 leadership began launching campaigns against Iraq from the very first. = This must=20 be remembered, as some imagine or try to suggest that the so-called=20 Iraqi-Iranian disagreement is only recent.

As evidence of my claim, I shall = quote certain=20 passages from a series of articles published in al-Thawra in Iraq on = June 12th,=20 13th and 14th on Iraqi-Iranian relations. These are as = follows:

"Relations between Iran and Iraq are = once again=20 troubled, and the Iranian media is again attacking Iraq, the Iraqi = leadership=20 and the Party of the Revolution after four years and more of silence. = Why is=20 this happening when there is revolution in Iran against the Shah, who = was openly=20 hostile and violently aggressive towards Iraq and the Iraqi Leadership = and the=20 Party of the Revolution from 1969 to 1975? Why is this happening when it = was the=20 Shah who took political, military, and all other actions open to him to = restrain=20 Iraq, and prevent it from surging forward with all its great potential = in the=20 Arab national arena.

"This is a big question which must = be answered=20 both clearly and frankly if we are to be fully aware of the situation = and the=20 obstacles faced before the situation worsens. When the Shah first began = his=20 information, political and military provocation against Iraq, which also = extended to the media, we said that it was in the interests of Iran, = Iraq, and=20 all countries within the area, for our two neighbouring countries to be = on good=20 relations. It was only sensible for both to search for a formula for = sound=20 relations between them, and to look to the factors which would unite, = rather=20 than separate them.

"The Shah, however, was conceited in = the=20 extreme, and believed himself to have the power and ability to continue = the=20 game. This vanity of his led him to believe he could change the = political=20 situation in Iraq, and in 1970, he embarked on his well-known conspiracy = with=20 scattered fag ends of traitors and mercenaries whose heads later rolled = in the=20 revolution. He was goaded on by his covetous desire to control the area, = by a=20 deep resentment of ancient history, and by the international forces = which wanted=20 to gain control of the area by spreading dispute and tension throughout. = The=20 Shah played the game, and was confident that he would be the winner. As = the=20 years passed, his plots against Iraq intensified to the point of war, = sometimes=20 overtly and sometimes covertly.

"If we go back and listen to what = Tehran radio,=20 the Tehran press, and the Tehran leadership were saying, we find that = the Shah's=20 rule used religion most of the time in his campaign against Iraq, and = that his=20 most important tools were men who professed to be religious figures. = This we=20 would do well to remember, for oddly enough, it is the same game which = is now=20 being played, even though the player is different.

"The then ruler of Tehran would = demonstrate=20 sentiments of brotherhood and friendliness towards the Arabs outside the = immediate area, but would inflict harm upon those within his vicinity.=20 Furthermore, the Shah, whilst establishing friendly relations and strong = alliances with some Arab rulers, was consolidating his campaign against = Iraq,=20 and sending his troops to occupy the Arab islands of Greater Tumb, = Smaller Tumb,=20 and Abu Musa in the Gulf. This we must also remember, as history is = about to=20 repeat itself in Iran, if it had not already done so, and using the same = methods.

The passage =20 goes on to say = the =20 following:

"Iraq immediately welcomed the = success of the=20 Iranian revolution, and sent a memo expressing its wish to establish = good=20 relations with Iran to the new government. It was also careful to = confirm this=20 by sending an official note clearly defining the clear and healthy bases = of the=20 relationship between the two countries.

"Iraq's position towards Iran and = its affairs=20 differs from that of other Arab countries, for as well as the factors = which=20 unite the Arabs with Iran, the two share a common border of several = hundred=20 kilometers. They therefore have direct mutual interests, and cooperation = between=20 them yields positive results, whereas any dispute between the two has = direct=20 negative effects. Iraq therefore openly clarified its position towards = the=20 Iranian revolution in a clear frank note.

"However, immediately after the = success of the=20 revolution by only a few days, we began hearing rumours and reading = newspaper=20 articles denigrating Iraq. At the time, we said that Iran was still = unsettled,=20 that there were different trends, wings and factions within the = country... that=20 there must be some who wanted to fish in troubled waters... and let us = not=20 forget imperialism and its agents... and all sorts of other = justifications. And=20 we remained silent and tolerated it all.

"Silence, however, did not stem the = tide of=20 insults, which grew worse and became even more vindictive. Those = responsible=20 perhaps thought that silence was a sign of weakness. This time, however, = we have=20 made official moves. Our embassy in Tehran has consulted the Iranian = Ministry of=20 Foreign Affairs, and drawn its attention to this harmful behaviour = towards Iraq.=20 An explanation was demanded, and met with only vague answers, and = unconvincing=20 excuses and procrastination.

"However, it is most noticeable that = the=20 majority of offensive remarks, both direct and indirect, came from = favorites of=20 Khomeini. Over the past few days, comments made by those such as Ahmad = Madani=20 and certain other Iranian officials have become slanderous in the = extreme. Iran=20 radio has also begun an organized campaign against Iraq, and we must = here ask=20 ourselves: Why?

"The Iranian revolution was one = against=20 imperialism, and was carried out independent of East or West. = Geographically=20 speaking, the closest country, also maintaining an independent position, = is=20 Iraq. Iraq is the largest fort in the struggle against imperialism in = the area,=20 and its resistance has been so forceful that it has become the biggest = thorn in=20 the flesh of the imperialist scheming. Iraq is a country completely = independent=20 of any international bloc, and it is only natural that those in a joint = position=20 should meet.

"If, as it is alleged, the Iranian = revolution=20 was in part for the sake of Palestine, then the country of which the = Palestinian=20 struggle currently has most need is Iraq. This is because it is the = largest=20 country in the Arab East, and the one with most human, military and = economic=20 resources. On other counts, without Iraq there would be nothing to = bridge the=20 strategic gap resulting from the Egyptian leader's treachery of the Arab = nation=20 in its conflict with the Zionist enemy and imperialism. Does loyalty to=20 Palestine go hand in hand with harassing Iraq, the country of which = Palestine is=20 in most need?

"Had the Iranian revolution been an = Arab ally,'=20 then the first Arabs it should ally itself with should have been those = of Iraq,=20 as they are close neighbors. It is illogical to give the Arabs who are=20 physically distant sugar-coated words, and yet slander and plot against = those=20 who are physically close. Then they say they are Arab allies. What do = those=20 Arabs who are far from the arena gain from kind but empty words when = those close=20 to it are being subjected to direct insult and harm?"

***

These extracts have been published = as a=20 reminder. Let us not forget that in June, 1979, when these words were = written as=20 a responsible and sensible reply on the part of the Iraqi leadership to = the=20 campaigns launched by Iran's rulers, that the Arab nation had already = seen the=20 results of the Baghdad Summit, and recognized the need to take the same = path=20 further. As already mentioned, Iraq played an effective role in this. At = that=20 time too, the Syrian-Iraqi relations established as a result of the = National=20 Joint Action Charter still held, and the hopes and national aspirations = for=20 unity and joint action against the =20 Sadaat-Zionist alliance were =20 there in force.

However, it was during this very = same period=20 that the Iranian campaign against Iraq suddenly mushroomed, and that the = Arab=20 camp and the whole area witnessed a new attempt to confuse the issues = and weave=20 another intricate web.

The Iranians again stepped up their = feverish=20 campaigns against Iraq less than a year after the first had ended. This = time=20 they were not restricted to the media and politics, as terrorist = operations were=20 organized against the people and the community with the aim of = distorting the=20 picture of the internal situation in Iraq and imposing a secondary = battle on it.=20 On this occasion, the Iranian rulers did not even attempt to hide behind = facades, but used Persian elements and organizations within Iraq in = these=20 operations.

The important question here, giving = a basic key=20 to understanding the situation, is when did this take place? The first = time the=20 Iranian rulers launched their media campaigns was when Iraq was electing = its=20 eminent and positive role in the Baghdad Summit and the conference of = Arab=20 foreign and economics ministers towards securing a firm Arab stand = against the=20 Sadaat-Zionist-imperialist alliance and the Camp David conspiracy. This = time=20 they escalated their campaigns under the following = conditions:

Over recent months, Iraq has = undertaken three=20 major roles, the vital necessity of which to the Arab cause in general, = and to=20 the struggle against Zionism and imperialism in particular, is patent to = any=20 true nationalist.

First: Last September, the = non-aligned summit=20 conference was held in Havana, and there was a fierce and complex = political=20 fight to denounce the Camp David agreements and isolate the Egyptian = regime from=20 the non-aligned movement. Saddam Hussein played a fundamental part in = the final=20 outcome of the conference. Iraq used the weight of its good relations = with the=20 non-aligned nations in Latin America, Africa and Asia, and President = Hussein=20 transcended the delicacies of Arab relations, and strove to cement a = united Arab=20 stand. He visited each delegate in turn, and ignored protocol by even=20 approaching certain foreign ministers in the corridors for discussion. = This was=20 so that the Arab nation could make a vital inroad towards mobilizing the = Arab=20 and international political stand against Sadat's treachery and the Camp = David=20 conspiracy.

In the Havana Conference the issue = of=20 non-alignment itself was put to the test. Because the movement had lost = its=20 momentum and been influenced by the superpowers, there were strong = currents=20 attempting to pull it to one side or another of the international camp. = There=20 were therefore wider claims to the effect that the movement was in vain, = ultimately meaning that it would be destroyed and alignments again made = to the=20 two superpowers.

President Saddam Hussein played a = prominent role=20 in the Havana Conference as regards asserting the independent element = hostile to=20 imperialism, and the progressive and liberation nature of the = non-aligned=20 movement, and worked day and night to maintain the unity of the = movement. The=20 Conference was finally successful, and Iraq's positive role within the = movement,=20 its loyalty to its principles, and its readiness to sacrifice were = asserted, and=20 it is for these reasons that Baghdad was chosen as seat for the next = non-aligned=20 summit conference.

Secondly: In the hard political = battle waged by=20 President Saddam Hussein in Havana, it was revealed that serious gaps = existed in=20 Afro-Arab relations, and that a considerable number of African leaders = had=20 reservations concerning their treatment by the Arab states. In = consequence, they=20 were not prepared to adopt the same line as the Arabs in the Havana = Conference=20 against the Egyptian regime and the Camp David conspiracy.

After returning to Baghdad, this = matter was=20 given serious attention, and it was resolved to carry out an active = campaign to=20 establish friendly relations and firm cooperation with most African = countries.=20 This

was to let them know that the Arab = nation was=20 dealing with them, not only to draw their support for the Arab cause, = but also=20 because it was sincerely endeavoring to establish fruitful relations = with them,=20 and offer the impartial aid of which they were in such urgent need. This = was=20 particularly so in view of the losses these nations had suffered as a = result of=20 their support for the Arabs against the Zionist entity and its American=20 imperialist protector.

It is well known that Iraq has no = particular=20 interests in Africa, and that its basic aim was the Arab cause and Arab=20 interests in confrontation with the Zionist imperialist = enemy.

In recent months, there have been = several=20 meetings in Baghdad with many African leaders, a prominent sign of the = political=20 activity in this area. This was an aspect which drew the attention of = many=20 international forces and caused them concern.

Even though Iraq does not have huge = financial=20 reserves or excessive wealth to squander, since it is building a strong = army and=20 is deeply involved into a comprehensive and ambitious development plan, = yet it=20 put aside some of its needs to offer impartial and serious aid to = friendly=20 African nations in an attempt to make a positive contribution towards = improving=20 Afro-Arab relations, and towards establishing the African position, = crystallized=20 in Havana, against the

Camp David accords and the = traitorous path=20 followed by Sadaat. This is what Iraq and its leader, Saddam Hussein, = did in the=20 non-aligned and African fields.

The third and most important role = was the=20 national initiative or the eight-point national declaration made on = February=20 8th. Why was this declaration made?

The seizure of the hostages in the = American=20 embassy in Tehran, and the subsequent Soviet intervention in Afghanistan = created=20 a new situation in the area. Without going into detail about these two = incidents=20 here, one of the most serious results has been an increase of tension in = the=20 area and between the two superpowers. American imperialism has displayed = a=20 frantic tendency for military presence in the area and to seek military = bases,=20 or secure so-called military facilities for use against Iran and the = Soviet=20 Union.

In this climate, and to avoid the = Arab world=20 being turned into a stage for international conflict, or any part of it = being=20 used as a station for military forces engaged in matters of no concern = to the=20 Arab nation, President Saddam Hussein made his declaration on February = 8th,=20 1980. Equal reasons behind this noble declaration were cooperation and=20 fraternity, and the organization of Arab relations on sound nationalist = bases,=20 as well as the establishment of good-neighborly relations with the = surrounding=20 countries, including Iran.

Within a short period, the = Declaration had the=20 agreement and support of most Arab countries, and Iraq received many = assurances=20 of their readiness to adopt the Declaration and consider it a national = charter=20 to be strictly adhered to. Serious attempts were also made to convene an = Arab=20 summit conference to this end.

From March 25th-27th, a people's = conference was=20 held in Baghdad, and attended by a large number of Arab parties, = movements,=20 organizations and personalities. President Saddam Hussein's declaration = was=20 discussed and confirmed essential to the Arab nation and its struggle = against=20 the Zionist enemy and the imminent dangers.

Four days after this conference, = Iran began=20 harassing Iraq, and its political and media campaigns, and its military = build-up=20 against Iraq, were stepped up. After the Iranian rulers had frozen the = hostage=20 situation they concentrated on Iraq as their number one enemy. This is = not mere=20 inference, but what the Iranian officials themselves said.

Who, one wonders, will benefit, and = at this time=20 in particular, from the Iranian stand against

Iraq which has these roles and = responsibilities?=20 How can we explain the fact that the Iranian revolution, which is = allegedly for=20 independence from the great powers, is conspiring hatred against the = very=20 country and leadership which assert the method of independence embodied = by=20 President Hussein's declaration, and which are striving to confirm and = establish=20 it? How does one explain the fact that the Iranian revolution, which = claims to=20 support the Arabs in their battle against the Zionist entity, is = carrying out=20 these operations? This question is all the more vital, as these = operations could=20 divert Iraq from its effective role in the battle against the Zionist = entity,=20 and as Iraq assumed responsibility for the Baghdad Summit, has other = large=20 responsibilities, and is making a great deal of effort and = sacrifice.

Any honest observer of the Arab = situation and=20 conditions in the area cannot fail to see the damage and harm in the = Iranian=20 rulers' stand against Iraq, not only to Iraq itself, but also to the = whole Arab=20 nation and its struggle against the Zionist enemy alter Sadat's = treachery and=20 the American imperialist plan.

However, in order to clarify our = side of the=20 facts, we will tackle with frankness and confidence an issue which has = perhaps=20 occurred to those who arc confused about the Iranian position. In other = words,=20 did Iraq injure Iran first, and is this in retaliation? This is a vital=20 question, and to answer it we shall explain certain important aspects of = the=20 situation. It is well-known that a severe conflict emerged between Iraq = and Iran=20 under the rule of the Shah, and lasted several years, but who began=20 it?

In April, 1969, when the Revolution = in Iraq was=20 in its first year, the Shah unilaterally declared the annulment of the = 1937=20 treaty which agreed the borders and relations between the two = neighbouring=20 countries. In order not to forget and shuffle the cards, when the Shah = did this=20 he said he was rectifying a situation imposed on Iran in British = colonial days,=20 and that as long as his regime had "got rid of" the colonialist = domination he=20 was nullifying the treaty and demanding a new position on borders and = relations.=20 This is what the Shah said and no-one else.

Since that date, and until March, = 1975, the Shah=20 imposed an aggressive battle on revolutionary Iraq using all political = and=20 military means as well as the media, and endeavored to intervene in = Iraqi=20 affairs. In January, 1970, his intelligence plotted to overthrow the=20 revolutionary regime, and used Barazani to rebel against the revolution = and stir=20 up civil war.

At that =20 time^ the Shah, in =20 his declaration against Iraq, and in his intelligence = activities,=20 was, hiding behind the religious question, = playing=20 the communal card, and mobilizing some of those who claimed to be from = the=20 religious circle. Anyone who wishes to study the truth can refer to = these=20 facts.

After six years of conflict, the = Shah found that=20 the idea of engulfing or fragmenting Iraq, or of aborting its national = socialist=20 revolution, would not succeed, and that the conflict with Iraq was a=20 double-edged sword piercing his own country, as well as his armed forces = and=20 regime. It was then possible, in March, 1975, to reach agreement with = him on the=20 matters of coexistence and good neighborliness.

Then the Shah went and the new = regime came.=20 Without making accusations or debating the question, it is not = impossible,=20 objectively speaking, to understand the true intentions. Had Iraq any = interest=20 in harming Iran after the revolution whereby it would receive the same=20 treatment? The answer is absolutely and emphatically not. The regime in = Iraq is=20 a national socialist regime, and believes in the principles and = objectives of=20 the Arab Socialist Baath Party (ABSP). The latter's aims are not = "national", but=20 nationalist. Iraq, therefore, on principle, has no particular interest = in any=20 political or intellectual choice made by the Iranians, always provided = that such=20 choices do not arouse conflict between the two countries or stir up = aggression=20 against Iraq and the-Arab nation. Furthermore, Iraq, with its = revolutionary and=20 socialist regime, is more at ease if its neighbors share similar = principles and=20 trends. This is because it provides for better cooperation in the area = than if=20 the regimes are apart intellectually, socially and politically, as well = as in=20 the nature of their relations and their position on international=20 issues.

It is only natural for us to say = that the=20 closest options to the principles of the ABSP and the interests of Arab = Iraq is=20 for the political, social and intellectual option of the Islamic nations = to be=20 one where their Islamic character is asserted. This is because when they = do so=20 they necessarily grow closer to the Arab nation, and join forces with = the Arabs=20 in their struggle against Zionism.

Of this there arc living examples. = When Turkey=20 grew away from the spirit of Islam by virtue of secularism and = affiliation to=20 Western civilization it simultaneously grew further apart from the = Arabs. Not=20 only this, but on several occasions, particularly in the 1950's, it was = also=20 used against the Arab nation and its liberation movement, and = established=20 relations with the Zionist entity which were detrimental to the Arab=20 nation.

The same applies to Iran under the = Shah, who=20 attempted to constrain Iran to alienate itself from its Islamic = character. Iran=20 consequently became an enemy of the Arabs and an ally of their enemies. = Because=20 Pakistan, on the other hand, retained its Islamic character, even when a = party=20 to the Baghdad and Cento Pacts, it remained close to the Arabs, = supported their=20 causes, and rejected any form of relations with the Zionist = entity.

The revolution in Iran took place = when Iraq was=20 shouldering its responsibilities resulting from the Baghdad Summit and = the=20 National Joint Action Charter with Syria. In order to carry out these=20 voluntarily chosen responsibilities in an effective manner, Iraq was = therefore=20 at that time in greatest need of calm and stability on its eastern = borders. It=20 was also in greatest need of any new force to add to the balance of = power in the=20 area against the Sadaat-Zionist-American alliance.

So what possible political or = economic benefit=20 could Iraq gain from inflicting damage and injury on Iran? Absolutely = none, as=20 conflict leads only to losses which can in no way be offset by any = measure of=20 gain. Iraq could not enter into such a conflict unless coerced to do so = in=20 defense of its patriotic and national essence.

Since these are the bare objective = facts, and=20 since Iraq, as it is, and is seen to be, a responsible and sensible = leadership,=20 which over twelve years has demonstrated a superior capacity for = countering=20 difficulties and overcoming traps, would it ever enter into a battle of = this=20 type unless forced to do so?

Some might =20 say that Iraq brought up the = question of the=20 three islands, of Ahwaz, and of the Shatt = al-Arab =20 agreements, prompting Iran to respond in this fashion. Yes, Iraq did = indeed=20 bring up these three issues, but is it so strange for Iraq to want the = return of=20 the three islands occupied by the Shah of Iran with his military forces, = his=20 imperialist and expansionist arrogance, and the collusion of British = colonialism=20 and American imperialism? Is it not yet stranger still that the Iranian=20 revolution, which came, it claims, to uproot the Shah's regime and undo = his=20 policies and misdeeds did not declare from the first its resolve to rid = these=20 islands of the Shahanshah's colonialism?

What actually happened, after = attempts by the=20 new Iranian regime to avoid and ignore the question of these three = islands, was=20 that its leader, just as the Shah had done nine years earlier, openly = declared=20 the islands to be "Iranian", and said that he would not relinquish them. = So who=20 is to blame?

With respect to the Ahwaz region, = the Iranian=20 peoples, after the revolution which toppled the Shahanshah's dictatorial = and=20 fanatic regime, which for years had imposed a purely racial Persian = dominance,=20 denied their national characteristics, and deprived them of their legal = rights=20 within Iran, demanded a change in the situation. The Arabs of the Ahwaz = area=20 were amongst those who believed the revolution would grant their natural = and=20 legitimate rights, but the new leadership duped them in feud and hatred = exactly=20 as the Shah did. Let us not say more.

So whose position is it which = creates surprise=20 and inflicts harm? Is it that of Iraq, which supported the just demands = of the=20 Arab people of the Ahwaz area for autonomy within the framework of a = united=20 Iranian state? Or is the cause of astonishment the fact that the Iranian = "revolution" is denying the Ahwaz inhabitants and other Iranian peoples = their=20 straightforward and fair demands, instead bringing them ruin and = disaster? Or=20 was Iraq contradicting its principles and asking of others what it would = not=20 want for itself? Or =20 is the Iranian "revolution" = contradicting=20 its words with its deeds?

Iraq believes it is only natural for = the Iranian=20 peoples to have a form of autonomy within the framework of a single = Iranian=20 state. This principle it applied to itself by granting the Iraqi Kurds a = form of=20 autonomy practiced within the framework of the one homeland. So who is=20 contradicting who, and who is harming who?

Likewise, it is only natural for = liberation=20 revolutions destroying colonialist, dictatorial, and tyrannical regimes = to=20 present a new programme declaring the end of colonial dominance, and of = the=20 repression and injustices of the defunct regime. It is acceptable for = the=20 revolution to ask for time to see its programme through, and to discuss = the=20 nature and size of the demands made. But a revolution which denies these = demands=20 from the outset and maintains the previous status quo is not a=20 revolution.

The same principle also applies to = the question=20 of the Shatt al-Arab issue. The circumstances of the conflict between = Iraq and=20 Iran have imposed a formula for the Shatt al-Arab which is incompatible = with=20 Iraq's historical rights and interests in the area. This occurred when = Iran was=20 ruled by an expansionist imperialist regime, which, in its aggression = against=20 the Arab nation and Iraq, had the total support of American imperialism. = Why is=20 it abnormal for the new "revolutionary" regime, which advocates = fraternity with=20 the Arabs, to consider reinstating the rights denied by the defunct=20 regime?

Who is contradicting himself here? = Is it he who=20 demands rights arrested from him by a tyrannical oppressor? Or is it he = who=20 claims to have revolted against everything that oppressor represented, = yet who=20 continues to retain his hold over the latter's gains, namely the islands = and=20 Shatt al-Arab, follow the same policies towards the Iranian peoples, and = flare=20 up in anger and indignation each time it is mentioned to him?

It is not at all difficult for any = fair and=20 rational person to see just who is contradicting himself. The mass of=20 accusations and attempts to create confusion cannot conceal the clear = and simple=20 facts as seen and understood by anyone who has reasoning and = insight.

The truth, as history will show, is = that Iraq,=20 from its pure nationalist and principled premises, and from its = penetrating view=20 arising from its loyalty to principle, sensed very early on the spurious = and=20 contradictory nature of the statements made by the new Iranian = leadership. It=20 made sincere endeavours to uncover the truth and make it known to the = Arab=20 nation, and was first to do so. However, despite the accusations leveled = at Iraq=20 from certain brothers and relatives, we don't say enemies, what Iraq = felt proved=20 to be right, because the black and depressing truth emerged a few months = later.

Iraq inflicted no battle or harm = upon the=20 Iranian "revolution". Instead, with all sincerity and every good = intention, Iraq=20 put that revolution before its responsibilities, only to be requited = with this=20 resentment and injury which we see and live.

Iraq, again with all good = intentions, demanded=20 that Iran, after the revolution, change the policies affecting the Arabs = for the=20 worse, but the post-"revolution" rulers of Iran confirm that they and = their=20 predecessors are merely one and the same.

When making assertions, supported by = fact and=20 logic, that Iraq was not responsible for initiating the conflict with = Iran, we=20 are not aiming to throw light on the matter, but to rest our consciences = and=20 those of our brother Arabs, and to eliminate any likelihood of = self-blame. Some=20 may ask why we instigated the conflict when the revolution was in the = process of=20 being established, and faced with so many challenges and=20 difficulties.

The truth is, however, that it is = was the=20 Iranian rulers themselves who decided the issue. They began boasting = that they=20 had started the conflict intentionally, to the extent that they no = longer needed=20 to hide this fact as they used to do in past months. Headed by the = President of=20 the Republic, they have recently stated both clearly and frankly that = they are=20 now striving to "export the Iranian revolution", something which, as = Bani Sadr=20 said, they consider vital to the survival and continuance of their = "revolution".=20 The Iranian President himself has also openly declared his refusal to = have=20 discussion or mediation towards solving the problems with = Iraq.

Iran's campaign against Iraq is = therefore=20 nothing more than a result of the so-called "revolution export" plan. It = is not=20 a response to any determined stand or action supposedly taken by Iraq. = Nor is it=20 the effect of relations between the two countries. Were this the case, = how would=20 we be able to grasp the situation?

For the truth, we must discuss all = probabilities=20 without sensitivity, as anyone with confidence in himself and the fact = that=20 truth is on his side is not afraid to look deeper into any possibilities = or=20 hypotheses.

Let us suppose that the Iranian = leaders, who=20 were helpless to counter the major issues brought to the surface by the=20 revolution, and who reached an impasse over the hostage question, are=20 endeavoring, under the theme of "exporting the revolution", to export = their=20 problems abroad as a way of diverting attention from the internal = failure and=20 gaining time, or as an attempt to restore the ruined domestic front by = stirring=20 up an illusionary enmity. If so, is this the moral thing for them to=20 do?

The Arabs sympathized with the = Iranian=20 revolution, and wished it success. They were glad it had declared its = Islamic=20 identity, as this meant a mutual approach and concerted efforts between = them and=20 Iran in the struggle against Zionism. Is it

therefore gratitude and moral for = the Iranian=20 rulers to consider their Arab neighbors' land as a refuse ground on = which=20 to throw the remnants of their experiment, which is filled with = conflict=20 and contradiction? Has any friend of the Iranian rulers, = spreading =20 this about them said =20 that this behaviour of theirs, apart from the lack of = morality and=20 gratitude it displays, is a great miscalculation and a wrong=20 appraisal? The Arab arena, even if suffering some = negativity,=20 has no desire to become a refuse site for others, and indeed has the = wherewithal=20 to capably defend Arab territories with both honour and = pride.

Had the rulers of Iran found that = they could=20 keep themselves amused = with =20 their experiments inside Iran, would the situation in those countries=20 bordering the Zionist = entity, =20 as well as in the Arabian Peninsula and Gulf countries, have = allowed=20 for such games and experiments? Or would the = Zionist=20 enemy, which has so far succeeded in removing Egypt from the battle and=20 provoking communal strife in Lebanon, have exploited any opportunity = provided by=20 the Iranian scheming where a thousand such opportunities will surely = arise to=20 fully execute its scheming to dominate the area from the Nile to the=20 Euphrates?

Iran's rulers are blinded by = arrogance to an=20 important fact. They are also blind to it because forces inside Iran are = using=20 all means to hide it, and because certain opportunists, who give them = every=20 praise, are failing to explain the facts to their Iranian "friends". On = the=20 contrary, instead of bringing them to awareness and guiding them to the = right=20 path, they play on and thus compound, their vanity and = rashness.

What the Iranian rulers do not know = is that,=20 more than a year after the success of their revolution, they have turned = their=20 country into a stage for the game of covetous international powers. = Neither do=20 they realize that their capacity to amuse themselves =20 with (heir contradictory = and =20 topsy-turvy experiments is based in two factors. The first in the = continued How=20 of oil, and the second is that the international powers at logger-heads = in the=20 area are banking on the results which may arise from the unsettled = situation in=20 Iran. Once this has developed to the interests of one of those powers, = these=20 rulers will not able to do much about it if they continue to follow this = same=20 policy and ignore what is happening.

Have Iran's friends made their = associates aware=20 of this, and told them to beware of deluding themselves? Have they told = them to=20 keep a close watch on the situation, and have they warned them that they = themselves arc preparing the favourable conditions for their country to = be=20 handed over, whether intentionally or otherwise to these covetous = international=20 powers with their avidity for the area?

Let us move on to another = hypothesis, and=20 suppose that the Iranian rulers "have principles", and feel they are = right to=20 spread their experiment to other Islamic countries. Let us also = hypothesize=20 about their claim that, in so doing, they are aiming at destroying = Zionism and=20 imperialism.

For the export of any experiment to = be legal and=20 justified, and to persuade people that it will bring them strength and = the=20 ability to destroy powerful enemies like Zionism and imperialism, the = engineers=20 of any such experiment must first achieve outstanding and convincing = successes=20 in solving the problems and major issues they face. They must also = succeed in=20 creating the moral and material potential capable of meeting the dangers = and=20 challenges encompassing the experiment in question.

But have the rulers in Iran, who = heatedly urge=20 the export of their experiment to Arab countries, done this in Iran = itself? The=20 distinctive features of the Iranian situation now they have assumed = control are=20 as follows:

=97 The disintegration of Iran's = military=20 capability,

- The existence of = several =20 different centers of influence and decision, the = lack of=20 any real central power, and the sudden proliferation of disagreements = and=20 accusations amongst religious and political leaders,

=97 The eruption of conflicts = between the Iranian=20 peoples of non-Persian extract and the ruling leaderships, and a = complete=20 inability to solve the problem of the different nationalities within=20 Iran,

=97 The spread of anarchy and = unrest, and the lack=20 of security,

=97 The breakdown of production, the = destruction=20 of the economy, a horrendous increase in unemployment, and the absence = of the=20 majority of food products,

=97 Chaos in relations with the = countries of the=20 region, and in international relations.

This is the picture of Iran today. = Do her=20 leaders want to export all this to the Arab countries on the pretext of=20 destroying Zionism and imperialism?

Let us imagine these leaders have = achieved their=20 dreams of exporting their experiment to the whole of the Arab east, = because=20 logically speaking, the Zionist entity can only be resisted if = geographically=20 surrounded. Similarly, the Arabian Peninsula and Gulf countries, because = of=20 their basic interests, can only effectively counter imperialism if they = are=20 given direction and guidance as to how to do so.

Let us imagine these dreams have = been=20 accomplished, and that the situation in these countries now resembles = the=20 "pioneering experiment" in Iran. Let us imagine that the Iraqi, Syrian = and=20 Jordanian armies have disintegrated, that factional, political and = racial=20 differences have erupted in the Arabian Peninsula and Gulf countries, = that chaos=20 and insecurity reign, that production has come to a standstill, and that = socio-political contradictions have been kindled. Who then will be = destroyed:=20 Zionism and imperialism? Or the Arab nation and all the gains of the = Arab=20 struggle? I doubt we will have much difficulty replying to the=20 question.

Throughout the long years of open = war, by sowing=20 temptation and stirring up unrest, and through the various espionage = networks,=20 the media and counter-culture, Zionism has, with the hacking of = imperialist=20 forces, strived to fragment the Arab homeland, and to create interwar. = The=20 objective behind this is to cripple its capacity for revival, union, and = the=20 creation of a strong entity capable of resisting the Zionist entity and = its=20 expansionist projects. Even though Zionism achieved important goals by = occupying=20 the whole of Palestine and certain other Arab parts of land, inciting an = explosive situation in Lebanon, and drawing Sadaat into the ranks of = traitor,=20 the Arab nation has not surrendered to the Zionist-imperialist scheming. = It is=20 still resisting and preparing itself to face the Zionist entity and its=20 imperialist conspiracies.

Has the Iranian rulers' plan given = the Arab=20 nation additional strength in its battle, or has the execution of their = plan,=20 with or without their realization, achieved much of what Zionism and = imperialism=20 were aiming at?

The success of the Iranian leaders' = plan to=20 disintegrate Arab military power and cause communal and political = conflict, with=20 the resultant destruction of the existing entities, means that the = "Jewish=20 slate", which has so far been an alien body in the Arab homeland = rejected by the=20 Arab national forces, will become realities which coincide with the = realities=20 some wish to sec spread in the area. Should their plan meet with = success, this=20 Zionist entity will not only acquire the "legitimacy" it has lacked ever = since=20 its establishment, but will also assuredly and inevitably become the = strongest=20 petty state of all in the Arab cast. Likewise, the project of the = separatist=20 leaderships in Lebanon will acquire the legitimacy they still wish to = have at=20 any price.

So what benefit will the Arab nation = gain from=20 the plan to export the Iranian experiment in its struggle against = Zionism and=20 imperialism, even despite all the negative aspects of the current = situation? In=20 whose interests are Iran's rulers working when they urge this plan with = such=20 fervor? And who is inciting them?

Some might say we acknowledge the = existence of=20 corruption and negativity in the current Arab situation, and ask why, if = we are=20 revolutionaries struggling against these, we deny that the Iranian = revolution is=20 also making attempts to eliminate both? We do not deny anyone's role, = but for=20 any attempt to fight corruption and negativity to he-laudable and = effective, it=20 must take this direction, and be capable of doing so.

As we have pointed out, the expected = outcome of=20 the Iranian plan is certain ruin, and this is what the Iranian = revolution has so=20 far achieved.

There is nothing in the Iranian = experiment to=20 confirm the ability to build and merge in such a way as to actively = uproot=20 corruption, alter the negative aspects, and create an Arab revolutionary = capacity which can effectively hinder Zionism, imperialism, = and =20 the aftermath of their =20 existence they have committed in the Arab=20 homeland.

Should we tackle corruption and = negativity in=20 the way suggested by the Iranian experiment? Is it to be dealt with by = using=20 destruction, dividing the people, and unleashing pandemonium of = contradictions?=20 I don't think any Arab who is loyal and sincere would want = this.

If Iran's rulers are really = fighting, as they=20 claim,

corruption and negativity, why arc = they=20 concentrating all their efforts against a regime, which even adversaries = before=20 friends recognize as being honest, national and independent? This is in = addition=20 to the fact that these rulers are courting and allying themselves with = corrupt=20 regimes, which apart from being isolated from the people and surrounded = with=20 suspicion, is experiencing wide-scale feelings of Islamic revival = running high=20 against them.

However hard one might try to do so, = one cannot=20 find any justifiable excuses for the actions of Iran's rulers, nor = foresee any=20 beneficial results. Here we are not leveling accusations from a counter=20 position, but merely repeating what certain Iranian rulers have said of = one=20 another and of their activities. Indeed, the stream of contradictions = and=20 accusations made reveal the kind of rulers controlling Iran's fate. They = also=20 reveal the country's unhappy state, and just what depths of despair and=20 destruction the country, and even the entire area, may reach if these = rulers=20 should satisfy their whims and achieve their dreams.

The "Iranian revolution", which = surprised all=20 freedom-lovers when struggling against the Shah's regime, has lost its = shine,=20 and baffled its friends more than its enemies. Iran's rulers have now = made it=20 into a stage for all sorts of dangerous and unfavorable situations to = arise.=20 This is so not only for

Iran and its unfortunate peoples, = who have not=20 yet had the taste of freedom after years of being repressed, crushed and = tyrannized, but also for the whole area, particularly the Arab nation, = which is=20 waging the fiercest and most delicate battle of modern times against the = Zionist-imperialist alliance and the betrayal of the ruler of the = largest Arab=20 country.

Certain Arab officials and political = circles are=20 hiding their heads in the sand as an ostrich does, and behaving as if = there is=20 nothing to provoke concern and responsible action. Here we are not being = completely frank, as we have no wish to insult, but merely to cement a = loyal=20 Arab stand on this issue, and uncover just some of the falseness of = certain Arab=20 positions. Above all, we wish to say that if anyone thinks the = revolution in=20 Iraq, led by the ABSP and Saddam Hussein, is afraid for itself over the=20 so-called "export of the Iranian revolution", then they are suffering = from a=20 grave illusion.

The position in Iraq is not one of = "authority"=20 in the conventional sense, but a patriotic, national, socialist and = democratic=20 revolution comprising all walks of life, and immersing itself in all = cells of=20 society. Over twelve years of profound and comprehensive revolutionary = change=20 and sincere work to build the country and serve the people, a new Iraq = has been=20 created, felt by the millions to be their Iraq. The 17th-30th July = revolution is=20 their revolution, the Baath Party is their party, and Saddam I Hussein = is their=20 man and leader.

The ABSP is not a conventional = political=20 organization, but is composed of cells of valiant revolutionaries, who = came from=20 the deep countryside in northern, southern, and central Iraq, as well as = from=20 the popular areas of the towns. They are experts in secret organization. = They=20 are organizers of demonstrations, strikes, and armed revolutions, and = are the=20 champion challengers of oppressors and deviants. The Baathists were the = people's=20 hope in opposing the Baghdad Pact and Nuri Sa=92id tyranny. They were = the knights=20 of struggle against Qasim's dictatorship, and against communist and = anti-Arab=20 tyranny. They created the first armed revolution led by a mass = revolutionary=20 party in the Arab homeland when they rose up in 1963, and they led the = second=20 revolution in 1968 against Arif's corrupt and reactionary regime. These = are the=20 Baathists, and whilst they are like this, there is no fear for = them.

As for its leader, Saddam Hussein, = he is not a=20 politician who has inherited power or gained it through rigged = elections. He is=20 "the youth" who began his political struggle as a gun-toting feda'i in = Baghdad's=20 Rashid Street to teach the anti-Arab dictator Abdul-Karim Qassim, a = harsh=20 lesson. He is the fighter who was sentenced to death, led the secret = civil and=20 military cells of the Party after the counterrevolution of October, = 1963,=20 entered prison in 1964, and escaped to continue his struggle and leading = role=20 until the triumph of the 17th-30th July revolution. He is the fighter, = the=20 organizer, the thinker, and the leader.

Neither the Baath Party, nor Saddam = Hussein is=20 afraid. If either imagined it were possible to exploit the sectarian = situation=20 in Iraq to threaten her unity, or to undermine the Arab character of the = Iraqi=20 people, they would be highly mistaken.

Iraq is a country with a long = history within the=20 framework of Arab = history. =20 Over thousands of years, its history has shown = that it=20 was always a fort of Arabism, and a fence defending invasions by the = Persians=20 and other covetous hordes. Were the Arab character of Iraq and the Iraqi = people=20 themselves liable to have their spirits broken, Iraq would have been = shattered=20 centuries ago, or in the modern age twenty years = ago during Qasim's rule =20 and the communist tide. It would not have waited another = twenty=20 years for the Iranian rulers to come from outside her borders under the = banner=20 of the Baath revolution and Saddam =20 Hussein's leadership t<* injure its unity and = Arab=20 character.

Iraq which has various Islamic = sects, and=20 several religious denominations and nationalities, is an integral unit = which is=20 indivisible. All those who imagine they can somehow do harm are invited = to try=20 and do so if they wish.

The question is not one of fear for = themselves=20 on the part of the Party or the revolution because of events in Iran and = her=20 rulers' threats. Iraq, with its national responsibility, is afraid of = the ills=20 to which the Arab nation may be exposed with the situation the Iranian = rulers=20 want to impose on the area, and with the suspicious opportunistic and=20 contradictory stands adopted by certain Arab leaderships and political = circles,=20 who are behaving in such a way as to encourage the Iranian rulers to = delude=20 themselves and continue as they are, without any sense of=20 responsibility.

Many ruling leaderships and = political parties,=20 in: fact, are behaving in a highly illogical fashion towards the = situation in=20 Iran. Let us take some examples. A day has not yet passed since the = Iranian 1=20 "revolution" when Khomeini, Bani Sadr, Qotbzadeh, or other rulers have = not=20 issued abusive f statements condemning communism and the Soviet 1 Union, = and=20 this is a well-known fact.

On the other hand, however, we find = communist=20 organizations, such as Na=EFf Hawatma's organization, = the =20 Iraqi Communist Party, = and =20 others, supporting these rulers who insult them in their press, and = direct=20 fabrication and slander against the revolution in Iraq, the = revolutionary party,=20 and its national revolutionary leadership.

To take another example, the Iranian = media are=20 conducting a malicious campaign against the ABSP and the nationalist = ideology,=20 and Bani Sadr, amongst other things, is openly accusing Arab nationalism = of=20 being "Zionist". In Syria, a regime claiming to be of the ABSP and based = on the=20 "nationalist ideology" is disregarding the "ideological" insults, and, = allying=20 itself with Iran's rulers against Iraq.

A third example is that Colonel = Qaddafi stand:=20 accused of having liquidated Musa Sadr. The Iranian leaderships continue = to=20 blackmail the Libyan Government and to stir the matter, which is barely = kept=20 silent a week than it flares up the next. After Qaddafi had been = "cleared" of=20 spilling Sadr's blood, the Iranians decided to form a supreme = committee*-to=20 reinvestigate, and then adjourned the matter. T<> date, the = Iranian=20 leaderships are refusing to have diplomatic relations with Libya, whilst = Qaddafi=20 himself continues to heap praise on the Iranian "revolution", and = describe it as=20 an extension of his own "r< evolution".

What is the explanation for this = peculiar=20 situation, and what is the intention behind this complicated process of=20 shuffling the cards and building an intricate maze? Is it not strange = that the=20 three parties referred to, namely the communists, the Syrians, and the = Libyan=20 regime, claim to be holders of "ideologies"... and yet these = "ideologies" of=20 theirs are vilified day and night by the Iranian regime? Is it not also = strange=20 that these three "ideological" parties behave as if they are deaf and = blind,=20 heaping praise on and lending support to these rulers?

We shall not explain the positions = of these=20 "ideological" masters, as it is their responsibility to do so to those = who=20 belong to their "ideologies". However, we shall at least see one rather = odd case=20 which encourages the Iranians to be vain, reckless, the suspect and = continue=20 with their damaging behaviour, their sick dreams, and their dubious = scheming.=20 This is that when faced with such circumstances and examples, they find=20 themselves incapable of tolerating Iraq's solid and adamant principled = stand,=20 this being in complete harmony with itself, its doctrine, and the = interests of=20 the Arab nation. They then become hysterical, as manifested in the = statements=20 and actions of those rulers today against Iraq and the Arab Gulf states, = or in=20 other words, against those Arab countries which are geographically close = to=20 them, because they find hypocrisy with the "far away" Arabs.

What is wanted of the area, the Arab = nation, and=20 the matter of its future in terms of unity, independence and liberating=20 Palestine by shuffling the cards, and creating such mazes? The area has = never=20 before seen a process combining such complexity, blindness, = spuriousness, and=20 hypocrisy.

Who is behind this wide and = complicated process=20 which has never before been paralleled? Who is responsible for making = Islam=20 reject and clash with revolutionary and socialist Arab = nationalism?

How dare Bani Sadr describe Arab = nationalism as=20 Zionism? Or was Arab nationalism not the banner under which the Arabs = struggled=20 against the Ottomans and their chauvinistic fanaticism? Or was not Arab=20 nationalism, with its progressive liberation essence, as borne by the = prime=20 national strugglers, the ABSP, Jamal Abdul Nasser, and the Algerian = Revolution,=20 the driving force of the masses against British and French colonialism = and the=20 military alliances? Or was not Arab nationalism the revolutionary force = behind=20 the Arab and Palestinian struggles against Zionism and = imperialism?

Why then should anyone wish to = distort and=20 destroy it in this way, and in whose interest? How should we understand = the=20 alliance, sometimes open and sometimes covert, between movements using = religion=20 as a cover and certain parties and communist movements, when they have = such=20 obvious contrasts? What united them as one to deal a blow to Arab = nationalism,=20 and to entertain misgivings about the methods used for gaining national=20 independence? Why are they rushing along so blindly and with such venom = to=20 destroy the national league, which united the nation, despite its = differences,=20 and unified the struggle against Zionism and imperialism?

Who is behind this complex process = of shuffling=20 the cards and creating a maze, with the aim of instigating conflict = between=20 those elements which are supposedly in harmony, and achieving harmony = between=20 those elements which are supposedly in contradiction? Which evil forces = are=20 behind the attempts to spread confusion amongst the Arab youth and=20 masses?

What benefits are to be gained from = all this by=20 the nation? Is this the situation which will strengthen the nation in = its=20 struggle against Zionism? Or is it the situation which will lead to the=20 fragmentation of the Arab nation, cause conflict to erupt, and spread = the=20 Lebanese experience over more parts of the Arab world, so that Zionism, = which=20 has reached the banks of the Nile with its conspiracies, will reach the = banks of=20 the Euphrates?

Does = this =20 situation strengthen = the =20 Arab nation's struggle against imperialism? Or = will=20 imperialism use it to increase its control over the small portions of = land=20 resulting from the fragmentation of the nation, and then the nation will = lose=20 its independence? Will hopes for unity and the liberation of Palestine = be lost?=20 And will the Arab nation return to the Mameluke period or the era of = petty=20 kings, and be distributed amongst the superpowers?

Why is all this venom being directed = against=20 Iraq and its sincere national leadership? Does this not indicate a = pernicious=20 attempt to injure Iraq and what it has represented in history, and what = it today=20 represents in the new life of the Arabs?

Iraq, led by the ABSP and Saddam = Hussein, is the=20 outstanding model of complete patriotic and national independence, = economic=20 independence, political independence, and free will.

Iraq is the model of the Patriotic = and national=20 rule which, without distinction, puts people on an equal footing. It = spread=20 national unity, security and stability, and provided the right = conditions for=20 the country to grow and flourish. All over Iraq everything has = progressed:=20 agriculture, industry, culture and services. The rates of development = have=20 increased in all fields, and the Iraqi is living a new life, and happy = horizons=20 are opening to each citizen and countryman.

Iraq is the country which watches = over Arab=20 interests, sacrificing its own interests for the nation's independence = and=20 sovereignty, and for the liberation of Palestine.

Iraq's leadership took the historic = initiative=20 of opposing the Camp David conspiracy and Sadat's = treachery, =20 and assumed = responsibility =20 for the Baghdad summit, which = it still=20 continues to do. Iraq's leadership =20 presented President Saddam Hussein's = declaration on March 8th to protect Arab territory = from =20 foreign influence, and prevent the establishment of foreign = military=20 bases at a time when fervent =20 imperialist attempts to spread = influence=20 over Arab territory were being made. Iraq's leadership, with the = Charter, called=20 for the relations of the Arab nation with its neighbors to be based on=20 cooperation, good-neighborliness, = and =20 fraternity.

This is the model which Iraq today = represents.=20 So in whose interest is this poisonous venom directed against it? Is = there an=20 attempt to inflict punishment on Iraq because of what it has done and = what it=20 now represents in Arab life?

The Arab masses are suffering from = many negative=20 attitudes, and are being assailed by various forces aiming at distorting = the=20 picture before them, weaken their self-confidence, and push them into = dangerous=20 situations. But these masses, which have been deep in experience, are = able to=20 distinguish right from wrong, facts from lies, and truth from falsehood, = even=20 despite all attempts to shuffle the cards and weave intricate webs and = mazes.=20

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